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When Congress Gives You Lemons:
Alternatives to Legal Services
Corporation Funding in the Quest to
Provide Access to Justice
DAVID PAI*

"Equal justice under law is not just a caption on
the facade of the Supreme Court building. It is
perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our
society .... It is fundamental that justice should
be the same, in substance and availability, without
regard to economic status."
- U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis

Powell, Jr., 1965.1

Introduction
Imagine that you are playing blackjack in a Las Vegas casino.
The dealer explains the rules -there are two decks of cards, dealer
shuffles, and the closest to twenty-one without going over wins.
You play and win the first round. Beginner's luck. You play again;
you win again. The others at the table coerce the dealer to add a
new house rule. You can't use aces, while everyone else can. You
still win your fair share of rounds. The others force the dealer to
add more rules: you may not "double down," and you must discard
all face cards.
Nonetheless, you still win your fair share.
Eventually, the dealer imposes so many rules against you that the
only card worth anything to you is the two of hearts. Sound fair?
* B.A., Boston University, 1996. J.D., University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, 2002.
1. As quoted in the REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE
FOR LEGAL SERVICES 3 (Dec. 1990)).
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Of course not. Yet this is essentially what Congress has done to
legal aid attorneys working on behalf of the poor.
Since 1996, Congress has imposed substantial restrictions on
lawyers funded by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC).2 These
restrictions include banning LSC-funded attorneys from filing class
action lawsuits, prohibiting them from claiming any statutory right
to attorneys' fees, and barring them from bringing any challenges to
an agency's rule-making authority. 3
Aside from imposing
restrictions, to which the courts have largely acquiesced, Congress
has also slashed the LSC budget by a third. 4 The result? Denying
the poor access to justice.
According to the last study on the legal needs of the poor,
commissioned by the American Bar Association in 1994,
approximately eighty percent of the civil legal needs of the poor are
unmet. 5
Even Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a relatively
conservative justice of the current Supreme Court, admits, "there
has probably never been a wider gulf between the need for legal
services and the availability of legal services." 6 This is unlikely to
change, particularly because the legal profession has become more
tolerant of a system in which money matters more than due process
and equal protection. 7 Gone are the mythical days of Atticus Finch,8
a lawyer-statesman who dispensed his advice as needed, without
discrimination as to a client's income or social status. Money was
supposed to be an afterthought. Rather, the profession preferred to
enamor itself with the responsibility of being the torch-bearers of the
law. 9 For better or worse, that sentiment has changed. Despite LSC
opponents' claiming that pro bono representation and contingency
fee arrangements will satisfy the legal needs of the poor, 10 all
2. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 1600-43 (2001).
3. Id.
4. See Mary Wisniewski Holden, Clipped Wings and Budget Cuts Tax Legal Aid, CHI.
LAW., Aug. 1997, at 1; see also Suggested List of Priorities for LSC Recipients, 61 Fed. Reg.
26,934 (May 29, 1996); Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Budget Cuts Legal Aid to Poor, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1996, at 3.
5. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Themes in Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC

GOOD 1, 2 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995).
6. Id. (quoting United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
remarks at the Pro Bono Awards Assembly Luncheon of the American Bar Association
on August 12, 1991).
7. Lisa G. Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by
Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 219 (1999) (discussing the legal profession's
preoccupation with profit and the rising dominance of income generation).
8. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Harper Collins 1999) (1960).

9. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 294 (1993).
10. The Futureof the Legal Services Corporation:Examining a Wide Variety of Views on the
Legal Services Corporation and To Try To Determine Whether or Not To Reauthorize Funding
for Legal Services, Reform the Organization, Block Grant the Money to States, or Eliminate
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indications point toward the profession's continued devotion to
profit-maximization while neglecting potential low-income clients.
Thus, the rift between the poor's theoretical rights to justice and
their operative rights to judicial remedies has widened.1
Rather than engage in a politically futile discussion on why the
LSC restrictions should be lifted, or hopelessly and unrealistically
call upon the private bar to consider equal access over profits, this
paper argues for a more attainable aspiration: instituting
incremental changes in the nonprofit legal services funding strategy.
Part I offers a history of the LSC and explains how it is currently
regulated and financed.
Part II explores alternative funding
strategies for states and public interest firms seeking to fill gaps
gouged by the LSC restrictions, generally focusing on California. 12
Part III concludes with an observation that by focusing on these
piecemeal changes in fundraising, legal aid attorneys inevitably
empower themselves to move away from the inefficiencies of
achieving social change through litigation, and into a more holistic
(recognizing that providing access to justice is merely one of many
tools to combat poverty) and collaborative (working with all
lawyers, not just legal aid attorneys, as well as other professionals)
vision of lawyering for the poor.
I. The Evolution of the Legal Services Corporation
As defined by the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, the
mission of the LSC is "to promote equal access to the system of
justice and improve opportunities for low-income people
throughout the United States by making grants for the provision of
13
...civil legal assistance to those.., unable to afford legal counsel."
The objective is equally ambitious: to reaffirm the faith of the poor
in the rule of law and provide representation of the "highest
quality" to "serve best the ends of justice." 14
The LSC rhetoric stems from its roots in President Lyndon B.
Federal Involvement in Providing Legal Services to the Poor Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 95 (1995) (prepared statement of William Mellor,
President and General Counsel, Institute of Justice) [hereinafter The Future of the Legal
Services Corporation].
11. James Regan, Note, How About a Firm Where People Actually Want to Work?: A
"Professional" Law Firm for the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693, 2708
(2001).
12. The author is a member of the California State Bar. Although many of the
examples in this section focus on California, they are provided to illustrate general
nationwide trends.
13. LEGAL
SERVS.
CORP.,
MISSION
STATEMENT,
at
http://www.lsc.gov/welcome/welwhat.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(2)-(3) (2002).
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Johnson's War on Poverty programs.' 5 Prior to the LSC, the Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) was established pursuant to the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.16 The OEO, among other things,
was the predecessor to the LSC, and marked the first time the
federal government committed itself to funding legal aid
programs. 17 The OEO adopted a highly proactive agenda, initiating
high-profile impact litigation,18 organizing groups of poor people,
and involving them in the OEO administration. 19 OEO's priorities
included outreach efforts, community education, and a "physical
presence in the community in order to identify what the critical
needs are for that community and fashioning a legal response to
it."20

Perhaps the OEO did its job too well.21 In 1973, President
Richard M. Nixon dismantled the OEO Legal Services Program after
years of partisan bickering over the ostensibly radical mission of the
OEO.22 Democrats in Congress responded with the LSC Act of
1974.23 As with most congressional creations, the Act represented a
compromise of interests-those on the left who wanted LSC
recipients to be professionally and politically independent, and
those on the right who sought to prevent the LSC from becoming a
vehicle for social reform or political action by limiting its
independence. 24
As such, the Act formed a private, nonprofit corporation to
perform similar grant-making duties formerly handled by the
15. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1272-78 (1986) (describing President Johnson's War on Poverty programs).
16. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed 1981).
17. Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services
Practice,4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433, 437 (1998).
18. Impact litigation is "litigation oriented toward the change of institutional norms
or practices, rather than the resolution of individual problems." Lucie E. White,
Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 535 n.1 (1987-88).
19. JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 75-89 (1982) (discussing the
impact of the OEO program on legal services for the poor in Chicago).
20. OFFICE OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS
(1967).
21. Interestingly enough, the first director of the OEO under Nixon was none other
than Donald Rumsfeld, who became a surprisingly strong advocate of its legal services
for the poor program. James Mann, Young Rumsfeld, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
2003, at 98-99.
22. Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation,61 CORNELL L.
REV. 681, 694-95 (1976).
23. Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2003)).
24. See Gary Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 337, 33738 (1980) (noting that some members of Congress were concerned that the OEO, in the
span of five years, increased the number of legal aid attorneys from 600 to 2500 and
increased total legal aid expenditures from $4 million to $60 million).
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defunct OEO.25 Its bylaws require bipartisanship: no more than six
board members may be from the same political party. 26 The eleven
members of the LSC Board of Directors are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, and funds for its operation
are appropriated by Congress. 27 Currently, hundreds of local
programs are funded by the LSC, with funds distributed on a
competitive basis to local legal aid offices. 28 All grantees are
required to maintain certain standards and follow applicable
restrictions. 29 Initially, these restrictions prohibited involvement in
criminal proceedings, abortion rights, political activity, school
desegregation, public demonstrations, picketing, boycotts, strikes, or
organizing workers.3 0 The restrictions ensured that LSC funds were
used to provide "direct" legal services rather than for "impact"
litigation.31 However, as the LSC expanded its programs in the
1970s, and as civil rights legislation granted private parties
additional civil remedies, advocacy efforts reverted back to impactoriented litigation.32
In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration sought to eliminate the
LSC program entirely.3 3 In 1981, as a result of this political hostility,
funding was cut from $321 million to $241 million.34 LSC
regulations extended the restrictions to prohibit legal aid attorneys
from being involved in redistricting suits. 35
The mid-1990s brought about another wave of attacks against
the LSC. Congress cut funding by one-third and imposed even
more restrictions on the type of work LSC recipients could carry
out.36 In 1996, the LSC budget was slashed from $400 million to
$278 million. 37 This, in turn, forced neighborhood legal services to

25. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2003).
26. Id. § 2996c; see also § 2996(5).
27. § 2996c.
28. LEGAL

SERVS.

CORP.,

WELCOME

TO

LEGAL

SERVICES,

at

http://www.lsc.gov/welcome/welmes.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
29. George, supra note 22, at 700-09 (discussing the structure and significance of the
Act).
30. Id.
31. Alan W. Houseman, A Short Review of Past Poverty Law Advocacy, 23
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1514, 1520 (1990).
32. Id.
33. DOUGLAS J, BESHAROV, Introduction to LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME FOR

REFORM, at xiii (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990).
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 1632.3 (2004).
36. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2003)); Lakshmanan,
supra note 4.
37. Id.
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either close theirs doors or reduce staff.38 Even more detrimental
than the budget cuts were the substantive restrictions levied on
remaining legal aid staff attorneys. These restrictions included the
following:
" Prohibited involvement in class action lawsuits,
39
including filing amicus briefs on behalf of clients.
Thus, a lawyer who saves one baby from lead paint
cannot save several hundred more without filing
numerous identical cases. This creates an untenable
result: a lawyer is unable to tackle pervasive and
systemic harms on behalf of her clients, which renders
her unable to fulfill her professional responsibility to her
clients.
* Forbade LSC recipients from providing legal services to
certain immigrants who are parolees, famiLy members of
amnesty aliens, persons with Temporary Protected
Status, and undocumented aliens. 40 This was the main
attack point for conservatives in the newly Republicanmajority 104th Congress. Lobbyists sent wave after
wave of complaints from private, individual farmers to
testify about their business losses resulting from migrant
4
farm workers who litigated for back wages. 1
Ultimately, the farmers and their lobbyists convinced
members of Congress that appropriating funds to be
used by noncitizens against a sizeable voting
constituency verged on political suicide. Of course, the
lobbyists less sympathetic clients were pleased as
well. 42 The only exception: legal aid lawyers may
abuse
represent undocumented immigrants in domestic
43
cases, but only if they use non-LSC funds.
* Barred participants from accepting court-awarded
attorneys fees, even if the right to claim fees would be
the client's best source of leverage. 44 This prohibition is
especially hurtful in Title VII cases where the fee is used
38. Telephone interview with Ramon Arias, Executive Director, Bay Area Legal Aid
(Apr. 24, 2002). Arias was also the director of the now-defunct San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, which consolidated with other Bay Area
legal services as mandated by the LSC guidelines. The forced consolidation constituted
a twenty-five percent reduction in staff and required closure of the Solano and Yolo
County legal aid offices.
39. 41 C.F.R. § 1617.2-.3 (2004).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5 (2004).
41. See The Future of the Legal Services Corporation,supra note 10, at 60-77 (statements
of Robert DeBruyn, President, DeBruyn Produce Company and Dean R. Kleckner,
President, American Farm Bureau Federation).
42. See Grover Norquist, Defunding the Left, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1995, at 56.
43. Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 45755 (1997) (codified as
amended at 45 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (2004)).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (2004).
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*

as an incentive to attract quality representation. Now, a
client is virtually precluded from using legal aid
attorneys and is left to choose among the private
plaintiffs lawyers, who inevitably temper their client's
interests with their own business interests. Imagine the
difficulty a client would encounter in seeking
representation if she sou ht mainly injunctive or
declaratory relief in a discrimination case where
monetary damages were small. She still may choose to
use a legal aid attorney, but as there is no opportunity to
recover fees, doing so would give the
defendant more
leverage and little incentive to settle. 45
Forbade participation in administrative rule-making
proceedings on behalf of their clients. 46 Legislators ana
policymakers are now free to fashion welfare programs
without input from the poor. Ironically, this restriction
was imposed pursuant to the 104th Congress' Contract
with America agenda, 47 which subsequenty left all fifty
states to implement welfare reform 48 without the input
from the very people those programs seek to assist.
Prohibited solicitation of clients. 49 This may seem fair in
an effort to prevent undue influence and intimidation on
the part of an overly aggressive attorney.50 However, it
wholly proscribes a lawyer from attempting outreach
efforts when a lawyer discovers that a pervasive
injustice is going on in their neighborhood. The lawyer
must unrealistically wait for the individual client who
suffered harm to materialize in her office.

Not only do these restrictions limit the use of LSC money, they
also restrict use of non-LSC funds. 51 Whereas an LSC recipient was
previously permitted to use non-LSC funds for any purpose, so long
as segregation of those funds was well-documented, the new
regulations forbid any agency receiving LSC funds from engaging in
restricted activities.
It is also worth noting that but for a relatively recent Supreme
Court decision striking the restriction as unconstitutional, the LSC
recipient was prohibited from challenging the constitutionality of a
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2004) (allowing awards of attorney's fees in actions to
vindicate civil rights).
46. 45 C.F.R. § 1612 (2004).
47. See

REPUBLICAN

CONTRACT

WITH

AMERICA

(1994),

available

at

http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
48. See Title I of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2157 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 61415 (2004)).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 1638.1 (2004).
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1-7.3 (2002).

51. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.1 (2004).
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state or federal welfare statute. 52 Had the Court upheld that
restriction, the consequences would have resulted in a Catch-22-a
legal aid attorney would be prohibited from representing a client
because the client's case was meritorious or forced to withdraw if the
client wished to raise constitutional defenses.
The experience of David Udell, a former attorney with Legal
Assistance for the Elderly in New York City, illustrates the
administrative quagmire through which an LSC-funded lawyer
must wade.53 Udell was lead counsel for four class action lawsuits
in 1996. 54 When the restrictions were placed into effect, Udell was

barred from "initiating or participating in a class action." 55 The
merits of those cases, however, were resolved earlier, and Udell was
56
merely monitoring the implementation of final remedial orders.
Each case sought, in different respects, a change in the Social
Security Administration's "nonacquiescence" policy of disregarding
Second Circuit holdings.5 7 Udell was told, when the restrictions
came into effect, that his office must discontinue all involvement in
the four class actions. 58 However, Udell believed that monitoring a
class action consent order was a "nonadverserial" role permitted by
the LSC regulations. 59 The LSC agreed, but later retracted when the
defense counsel reported
to the LSC that Udell was engaging in an
"adversarial" role. 60 During the course of monitoring, Udell
informed the court that the defendant may have violated the
settlement, 61 which the LSC believed triggered an "adversarial"
role. 62 In the end, the court intervened on Udell's behalf against the
LSC, insisting that monitoring consent decrees does not create an
52. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that prohibiting an
LSC recipient from raising constitutional challenges to a state or federal welfare statute
or regulation violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating
federal law from judicial challenge).
53. Telephone interview with David S. Udell, Deputy Director, Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of Law (Apr. 29, 2002); see also David S. Udell, The
Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the
Costs, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 337 (1998). Udell's salary, by the way, was funded
entirely by a New York state program supporting advocacy on behalf of Social Security
claimants. Yet, as mentioned above, his activities were still subject to LSC scrutiny.
54. New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990); Stieberger v. Apfel, 57 Soc. Sec.
Rep. Serv. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Robinson v. Chater, 1996 WL 5067 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (certifying class and denying
motion to dismiss).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2004).
56. Udell, supra note 53, at 340-45.
57. Id. at 340.
58. Id. at 341.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 342.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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actual adversarial dispute. 63 However, each time Udell reported a
discrepancy to the court, the merry-go-round continued. The
defense would notify the LSC, the LSC would issue a cease-anddesist letter and threaten to pull its funding, the parties would go to
court, and the court would decide whether or not his lawyering was
"adversarial."64 Eventually, perhaps weary of the constant
threats
to his organization's funding, Udell's supervisors pressured him to
withdraw from the case or leave the office. 65 He chose the latter. 66
David Udell's story is not uncommon.
In fact, many
organizations have turned down LSC funds since 1996, relying
instead on interest on state lawyers' trust account (IOLTA) and
other grants,67 as well as private donations. Greater Boston Legal
Services (GBLS), which was once the primary LSC recipient in New
England, decided to rely instead on private-sector donations and
state grants. 68 They were forced to cut staff, but built a relationship
with Harvard Law School's clinical program to keep their inner-city
clinics staffed. 69 In Virginia, long-time LSC recipient CharlottesvilleAlbemarle Legal Aid Society (CALAS) declined LSC funds and
entered into an arrangement where the old CALAS staff formed
another organization, Piedmont Legal Services, which received LSC
funds -thus becoming subject to LSC restrictions. 70 Though CALAS
and Piedmont shared the same board of directors, they are
physically and financially separate organizations. This enables
CALAS to operate without restrictions, providing services that
Piedmont is restricted from performing, while maintaining a close
working relationship with Piedmont. 71 CALAS relies exclusively on
63. Id. at 342-43.
64. Id.
65. Telephone interview with David S. Udell, supra note 53.
66. Id.
67. Generally, under state IOLTA programs, an attorney who receives insignificant
client funds must deposit them in a separate, interest-bearing bank account. The interest
income accrued from the accumulation of client funds is then used to finance legal
services for the poor. This program has come under challenge as violating the Takings
Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has recently upheld the concept of
IOLTA accounts in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003). The
Court noted that IOLTA funds did not constitute a taking because plaintiffs suffered no
pecuniary loss while the funds generated $200 million to help finance civil legal aid in
2001. Id. at 222, 237-38. But cf Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998)
(holding that under Texas law, any interest income generated by IOLTA accounts is the
property of the owner of the principal but declining to consider whether the IOLTA
program constituted a taking).
68. Wheatly Aycock, Divide and Conquer: How Poverty Lawyers Are Overcoming Curbs
on FederalFunds, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Udell, supra note 53, at 350.
71. Id.
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72
private donations and IOLTA grants.
In order to free themselves of LSC restrictions, both GBLS and
CALAS had to face budget realities and significantly cut back their
programs. In so doing, these organizations altered their roles from
being the most prominent major regional providers of legal services
to the poor to becoming less dominant, but equally important,
providers in terms of number of clients served. 73
It remains to be seen whether groups like CALAS and GBLS
can survive and maintain their programs with their current
arrangements with Piedmont and Harvard Law School,
respectively. But to many LSC recipients who cannot afford to
create a new entity like Piedmont, or cannot find a partner like
Harvard Law School, the CALAS/GBLS model is simply not an
alternative.
Many organizations face the Hobson's choice of accepting LSC
funds - thereby serving their clients solely on LSC's terms - or
eschewing LSC funds and gaining flexibility - a seemingly
existential risk. By pursuing diversified funding strategies, these
organizations seek to gain access to the funds necessary to
accomplish missions, while ensuring their long-term survival.

II. Alternative Funding Strategies for States and Nonprofit
Legal Services
"Something must be devised by which everyone,
however lowly and however poor, however
unable by his means to employ a lawyer and to
pay court cost, shall be furnished the opportunity
to set the fixed machinery of justice going."
- U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
74
William Howard Taft, 1926.
72. Id. at 354.
73. In this sense, they have become more like the Volunteer Legal Services Program's
Homeless Advocacy Project (HAP). See infra Part III. Located in San Francisco, HAP
does not receive a single penny from LSC coffers, despite having an identical mission
statement. HAP relies on a diverse pool of city and county grants, State Bar IOLTA
grants, private donations and foundation grants, and in-kind gifts (e.g., computers, fax
machines, office furniture, and other items donated by private firms). Nevertheless,
HAP's budget dictates that operations remain small, forcing the organization to turn
away more clients than they serve. It should, however, be noted that HAP is not
qualified to receive LSC funds because it is not a 501(c)3 organization; rather, it is a
project of the Volunteer Legal Services Program, which is sponsored in part by the Bar
Association of San Francisco. Interview with Teresa Friend, Managing Attorney,
Homeless Advocacy Project, in San Francisco, Cal. (Apr. 11, 2002).
74. William Howard Taft, Preface to REGINALD HEBER SMITH & JOHN SAEGER
BRADWAY, GROWTH OF LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (Nat'l Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin No. 398, 1926).
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Given the federal cutbacks and restrictions, the search for
alternative funding sources for legal services becomes even more
crucial. Organizations seek funds from the public, private, and
nonprofit sectors. Potential sources range widely, from possible
large fluid recovery trust funds, to small in-kind gifts from
churches.
Class Action Residuals -The Cy Pres Doctrine 75
Unclaimed class action awards are often put into a fluid
recovery trust fund, which in theory is used to further the interests
of the class. 76 Most cases using fluid recovery involve antitrust and
consumer protection, but the principles governing this type of
distribution apply equally in other areas of the law, such as civil
rights. Cy pres is used where class members cannot be identified, or
where a large number of people have suffered small monetary
losses. 77
In such cases, outright grants to public interest
organizations are made to ensure that the defendant does not enjoy
a windfall as a result of its own illegal conduct. 78
In California, the fluid recovery doctrine is firmly grounded in
both state case law and statutory authority. 79 For example, in
awarding over four million dollars to the plaintiffs in a class action
suit against the Levi Strauss Company, a court established a
consumer protection foundation that would administer the fund
and engage in consumer protection projects, including research and
litigation.80 Section 384 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
specifies that money from such a fund shall be paid in any manner
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying cause
of action.81
Federal courts have also validated the use of fluid recovery
trust funds. The Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court's choice
among distribution options "should be guided by the objectives of
the underlying statute and the interests of the silent class
1.

75. The term "cy pres" is derived from the Norman French expression cy pres comme
possible, which means "as near as possible." See EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1950).

76. Fluid recovery is also known as "cy pres" distribution, because it is a means of
distributing funds to their next best use.
77. See generally State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564 (1986)
(discussing acceptable forms of fluid recovery).
78. Id.
79. See Bruno v. Sup. Ct., 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining in
dicta the purpose of fluid recovery); CAL. CIV, PROC. CODE § 384 (2002).
80. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d at 567.
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384.

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2

members."8 2 In many instances, courts have concluded that legal
organizations and law school clinics are the next best alternative for
unclaimed funds. 83 One court even held a hearing where various
organizations submitted grant applications for the cy pres funds. 84
Even though LSC recipients are barred from any "adversarial"
role in class action litigation, such organizations may still be
recipients of fluid recovery grants in cases brought by private
litigants not subject to LSC restrictions. For example, a legal aid
office may look to boost its funding for its eviction defense practice
by developing a partnership with non-LSC housing rights groups
involved in class- or representative-actions where fluid recovery
may be a distinct possibility.8 5 As case law points out, the fund need
not be narrow in scope or geographically limited, so long as the
fund is consistent with the underlying statute it seeks to enforce.8 6
The Impact Fund, a nonprofit foundation in Berkeley,
California, highlights the strengths and drawbacks of this funding
scheme. The Impact Fund actively seeks cy pres awards as a revenue
stream. Indeed, since its inception in 1992, the Impact Fund has
relied extensively on private foundations, individual contributions,
and cy pres awards.8 7 It distributes $200,000 annually in grants to
small civil rights firms lacking the resources to adequately represent
their clients.88
Besides performing grant-making functions, the Impact Fund
staff also serves as legal counsel, filing amicus briefs for its grantees
or taking on its own cases. 89 Its major case to date is serving as lead
counsel in a gender discrimination suit against Wal-Mart. 90 In the
82. Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990).
83. In re Folding Carton Litig., 934 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1991) (awarding over $2 million
to National Association for Public Interest Law); Jones v. Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d
355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing distribution to Legal Aid Society Civil Division despite
thin ties to purpose of litigation fund); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (approving distribution to law school securities program instead of bar
association); Drennan v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7776 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(approving distribution to Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance Foundation).
84. Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens Ill., 827 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (distributing
the $2 million ultimately to fourteen nonprofit groups, including legal organizations,
law schools, and an art museum).
85. The final distribution of the funds is at the discretion of the judge and the
prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.4 (1997).
86. See cases cited supra notes 77-80, 82-84.
87. THE

IMPACT

FUND,

2003

ANNUAL

REPORT

13-14

(2003),

available at

http://www.impactfund.org/publications/ImpactFund3A-nnualReport.pdf.
88. Id. at 7-8, 14.
89. Id. at 3-5.
90. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252 MJJ (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2001);
Impact Fund, Federal Judge Orders Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Nation's Largest Private
Employer, To Stand Trial for Company-Wide Sex Discrimination (June 22, 2004), at
http://walmartclass.com/walmartclass94.pl?wsi=0&websys screen=walmartclass-case
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largest employment discrimination suit ever filed, the suit charges
that Wal-Mart Stores deny female employees promotions, equal
pay, favorable job assignments and training. 91
While the potential for a cash settlement windfall is substantial,
the drawbacks of relying heavily on these funds are clear. The
Impact Fund's annual operating budget is less than $500,000, with
the staff running a $125,000 deficit. 92 Individual grants typically
range from $10,000 to $15,000, with a $25,000 maximuminsubstantial figures considering the costs of litigation today. 93
Thus, though highly effective and attractive, cy pres funds are scarce
and difficult to rely on.
2.

Fee Increase for Bar Dues to Pay for Legal Services to the Poor
The advantages of mandatory fee increases to fund legal
services to the poor are significant. Fees provide a stable source of
income, and encourage the profession to commit to the notion that a
special obligation exists for lawyers to promote access to justice.
However, there is concern that mandatory fees used to fund legal
aid officers would be compelled speech. In Keller v. State Bar, the
Supreme Court held that state bar dues used for political and
ideological activities violate the First Amendment. 94
Thus,
mandatory fees slated to go to legal aid may fall into the Keller trap.
However, a constitutional analysis requiring heightened First
Amendment scrutiny does not necessarily invalidate the state
interest immediately. 95 Rather, it looks to see whether the state's
interest is justifiable (or germane to the fees), and whether that
interest is narrowly tailored so as not to unduly violate the First
Amendment rights of those affected. 96
On the issue of raising dues to fund legal aid offices, a court
could go either way in its determination. Much depends on how the
developments.
91. THE IMPACT FUND, supra note 87, at 4.
92. Id.
93. THE

IMPACT

FUND,

FREQUENTLY

ASKED

QUESTIONS,

at

http://www.impactfund.org/pages/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
94. 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (ruling that those activities were not germane to the purpose of
compulsory bar membership).
95. Compare Id., and United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 412-14 (2001)
(holding that a Secretary of Agriculture assessment imposed on unregulated mushroom
growers to promote mushroom sales violated the First Amendment), with Morrow v.
State Bar, 188 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding mandatory State Bar dues as it
relates to funding State Bar regulatory functions), and Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1997) (holding that compelling regulated tree fruit
growers working as a cooperative to fund generic advertising required by marketing
orders promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture did not violate First Amendment
rights).
96. Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
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court would answer the germaneness/justifiability prong of the
question-is delivery of legal services to the poor part of the State
Bar's statutory mission? Keller does not shed much light on this
issue. On one hand, the Court likens the State Bar to a public-sector
labor union,97 which would limit the bar to incurring mandatory
fees only for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive
representative, i.e., disciplining members, regulating the legal
profession, and maintaining or improving the quality of legal
98
services.
On the other hand, the Court refers to the State Bar's duties in
the administration of justice, 99 implying that compulsory dues to
provide for low-income legal services would in fact be a bona fide
responsibility of the State Bar. Indeed, all of the professional
rhetoric-the American Bar Association's pro bono mandate, 100 the
State Bar of California's plea for equal access, 101 the Professional
Rules of Ethics and Code of Conduct, 10 2 the etchings on the wall of
the Supreme Court 03 -seems to support this principle. In 1926,
William Howard Taft, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
said,
[t]he Constitution and the procedure made inviolable by it do not
practically work for the equal benefit of all. Something must be
devised by which everyone, however lowly and however poor,
however unable by his means to employ a lawyer... shall be
furnished the opportunity to set the fixed machinery of justice
going. 104
Ultimately, as with most issues of constitutional implication,
the question can only be resolved by the Court's own political and
ideological compass. It is likely a court could, in a compromise,
uphold the dues per se but order the State Bar to narrowly tailor its
needs. This could bring us back to square one, as the State Bar
97. Id. at 9.
98. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding that a
union cannot spend mandatory funds on ideological causes not germane to its duties).
99. Keller, 496 U.S. at 5.
100. CAL. STATE BAR PRO BONO RESOLUTION
(June 2002),
available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/accessjustice/2003-Pro-Bono-Res.pdf.
101. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, THE PATH TO EQUAL JUSTICE: A
FIVE-YEAR STATUS REPORT ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA (October 2002), available
at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ accessjustice/2002-Access-Justice-Report.pdf.
102. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2004 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Foundation Press 2004).
103. U.S. SUPREME COURT, SYMBOLS OF LAW: INFORMATION SHEET (May 2002),

availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/symbolsoflaw.pdf.
104. STATE BAR OF CAL., AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF ACCESS TO
CIVIL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 37 (Justice Earl Johnson, Jr. ed., 1996).
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would likely impose restrictions similar to the LSC in its effort to
narrowly tailor the use of those fees.
Aside from constitutional implications, raising bar dues may
not be the most prudent approach for the State Bar. Dues are
already expensive enough for lawyers not practicing in large firms.
Increasing dues may marginalize struggling solo practitioners who,
in a sense, do more to further equal access to the courts by their very
existence than their dues ever will. Nonetheless, states have already
begun exploring and instituting fee increases. In 1997, Minnesota
became the first jurisdiction in the U.S. to institute an attorney
registration fee increase to support legal services.105 This change
generated an estimated $850,000, which was administered by a
court-appointed committee. 106 Ohio's Supreme Court increased the
attorney registration fee by $50 in 1998, generating an additional
$1.75 million. 107 Of that sum, $375,000 went to the IOLTA coffers. 08
The Ohio State Bar opposed the fee increase. They argued that
providing civil legal services to the poor is a societal problem, and
thus should be the problem of the legislature. It should not fall
solely in the hands of lawyers. Their concern was that, unlike the
integrated bars of other states, the Ohio State Bar is a voluntary
organization. Thus, they were concerned that a fee increase would
result in loss of membership. 109
3.

Value-Added Tax
Another promising source of revenue is a "sales tax" on legal
fees, with the proceeds going to fund low-income legal services.
Some countries, the Netherlands for example, already dedicate a
portion of their value-added tax on private lawyers to government
programs for the poor.110 Hawaii, New Mexico, and South Dakota
also levy a tax on legal fees, with the funds going to the general
coffers of the legislature."' Many see this as a way for private-sector
attorneys who do not wish to take on pro bono work to support
equal justice. The revenue potential is enormous. In California
alone, estimates range upwards of $160 million for a I percent tax on
112
the gross receipts of in-state law firms.
105. MEREDITH MCBURNEY, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, ABA PROJECT To EXPAND RESOURCES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, INNOVATIVE
FUNDRAISING IDEAS FOR LEGAL SERVICES §§ 1-10 (1998).

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at §§ 1-11.
Id.
Id.
Id.

110. STATE BAR OF CAL., supra note 104, at 59.

111. Id.
112. Id.
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Not surprisingly, this idea has its share of detractors. 113 Private
attorneys cite the loss of profitability and loss of business. Some
firms would undoubtedly seek to relocate in tax-friendly states like
Oregon or Washington. Large firms fear they would lose business
to in-house counsel. Small firms and solo practitioners would
wonder whether they could survive. Business advocates would
claim that more transactional costs, let alone another tax, would spin
the economy further down the abyss of a recession.
While the detractors have a point, the same argument can be
made with respect to all taxes. Even a fraction of a one percent tax
represents a sizeable chunk of desperately needed funds. Further,
an economist can easily figure out at what point a little tax becomes
too much. Regardless, the point may be moot. To date, at least in
California, no legislator has seriously proposed a value-added tax
on legal services.
4.

Creating LMOs - HMOs for Legal Services
One delivery method that may foster popular middle-class
support is a statewide prepaid legal insurance plan. Premiums
could be charged on a sliding scale basis, with the state subsidizing
the difference.
A program of this magnitude could have dramatic
consequences, but arguably does nothing to help the legal aid
attorney. There is no increase in revenue, and the state will have to
provide an additional subsidy akin to Medi-Cal without any new
revenue projections. Insurance companies, on the other hand, stand
to profit dramatically.
The California State Bar made an unsuccessful attempt to
establish a group dedicated to prepaid legal services over twenty
years ago. 114 It failed due to lack of interest.11 5 But as attorneys'
billing rates increase, prepaid legal services are increasing in
popularity. 1 6 A glance at the existing products clearly shows a need
for the State Bar to provide guidance and regulation with respect to
legal service insurance products.117 In fact, it remains to be
determined by the courts whether prepaid legal services offered

113. Id. (noting that attorneys in Massachusetts brought a lawsuit against the tax for
loss of profitability and loss of business).
114. Id. at 50.
115. Id.
116. This is evident in the ABA's revised Model Rules governing an attorney's direct
contact with prospective clients, which allows a lawyer to participate in a prepaid legal
services plan to solicit clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2002).
117. See generally Prepaid Legal Services, Inc., at http://www.prepaidlegal.com (last
visited Dec. 28, 2004).
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today are nothing more than a pyramid scheme.118
5.

Finding God
It is well documented that most charitable contributions go to
churches and religious organizations. 119 A legal aid agency may be
able to tap into that funding pool by integrating its services with
traditional functions of the religious community, which could yield
more than just monetary benefits. Church affiliation provides a
critical mass of volunteer support, staff, and outreach. For what it's
worth, an added benefit, at least in California, is that the Attorney
General has only limited oversight functions over religious
corporations.1 20 Although the Attorney General may sue for a court
determination that a corporation is not properly qualified or
classified as a religious corporation, a legitimate religious
corporation such as Glide Memorial Church 121 should have no
trouble maintaining that classification even if it does integrate legal
services into its array of programs.
Of greater appeal is the idea that legal services should co-exist
with programs such as shelters, family counseling, community
education, children services, domestic abuse prevention, and other
programs traditionally associated with churches. A one-stop clinic
where a client can address all her concerns, not just the legal ones,
gives the lawyer a better snapshot to make a fuller assessment of a
client's situation.
Utilizing the churches may have its drawbacks. Clients may be
less inclined to seek legal help because of religious differences, or
may avoid using the church-based services because they do not
wish to be subject to proselytization. 122 Lawyers may also not be as
independent from the church as they would like, and conflicts of
interest may arise between the church, a client, and the attorney.
However, the programs already in existence seem to work well.
118. See In re Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. Litigation II, CIV-02-273-C (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 2002).
119. A 2002 study by the Congressional Budget Office showed that, in 1995, 61
percent of itemized and nonitemized charitable contributions went to religious
organizations, compared with 8 percent for health and 9 percent for education. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE,

EFFECTS

OF ALLOWING NONITEMIZERS

TO

DEDUCT CHARITABLE

CONTRIBUTIONS (2002), at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4008&sequence=0.
120. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230(a)-(c) (2001).

121. For more information on Glide Memorial Church, see http://www.glide.org
(last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
However,
122. This is not to say that all church-based charities proselytize.
proselytizing is widespread in institutions such as jails and prisons. See, e.g., Samantha
M. Shapiro, Jails for Jesus: President Bush Wants Faith-Based Programs To Take Over Social
Services. But What Happens When Evangelical Christians Try Their Hand at Running
Prisons?,MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1, 2003, at 54.
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The Volunteer Legal Services Program, Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights, and Bay Area Legal Aid all work closely with Catholic
Charities on housing and domestic violence prevention issues. For
example, Catholic Charities, through its Season of Sharing fund, will
pay the overdue rent of tenants being evicted for nonpayment,
subject to certain restrictions. This gives added leverage to the legal
aid attorney at the mandatory settlement conference, and those
123
nonpayment cases often are resolved amicably.
An example of a more direct relationship between the church
and legal aid is the Chicago Legal Clinic (CLC).124 The CLC works
seamlessly with Catholic churches around the depressed South side
(it helps that its co-founder is a priest).125 The CLC has a Violence
Against Women Prevention Clinic funded entirely by a church. 126
In-kind services include rent space and support staff.127
A similar arrangement is being attempted in San Francisco. The
Reverend Cecil William's Glide Memorial Church has begun to
collaborate with HAP to provide a satellite legal office on church
premises. To date, Williams has agreed to provide desk space with
a computer and modem, to be used for a biweekly legal walk-in
28
clinic.1
6.

Expand Services and Apply for Non-LSC Federal Funds
Ironically, choosing to forego LSC funds serves as an invitation
for the legal aid agency to expand its services. As services expand,
the agency may become eligible for federal grants offered by other
agencies. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) provides grants to programs working on
housing issues and homelessness.129 HUD also administers Housing
for People with AIDS (HOPWA) grants. 30 These funds can be used
to bring disability discrimination suits against landlords refusing to
123. In fact, in all three nonpayment cases I have argued, the landlords seeking to
evict their tenants were compelled to dismiss their actions when Catholic Charities got
involved.
124. Telephone Interview with Ed Grossman, Executive Director, Chicago Legal
Clinic (Apr. 29, 2002).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Interview with Teresa Friend, supra note 73.
129. U.S.

DEPT

OF

HOUS.

AND

URBAN

DEV.,

HUD

GRANT

PROGRAMS,

at

http://www.hud.gov/grants/index.htrl (last updated Jan. 6, 2004).
130. CMTY. PLANNING AND DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
PEOPLE
WITH
AIDS
(HOWPA)
PROGRAM,
at

http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/aidshousing/programs/index.cfm
6, 2004).

(last visited Oct.
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rent to or harassing HIV-positive tenants. In addition, the Justice
Department offers Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and
Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) grants that can be used to staff
restraining order clinics and counseling services. 131
Necessitated by the need to cast a broader net to gain funding,
legal service providers are expanding their programs into non-legal
arenas. By doing so, the lawyers in these programs help to foster a
clearer vision of how a holistic law practice and collaborative
lawyering can work.
III. Reshaping Legal Aid Toward "Holistic" Services and
Collaborative Lawyering
"Helplessness does not stem from the absence of
theoretical rights. It can stem from an inability to
assert real rights."
- U.S. Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, 1964.132
Much of the crisis concerning legal funding can be traced to an
internal debate lingering in the minds of civic-minded lawyers: just
what is our role in combating poverty? Is a lawyer's duty merely
about access to the courts, or is it something more? Is it a lawyer's
duty to improve the overall situation of the poor? If so, providing
access to the courts is simply not enough. Legal scholars have
criticized the traditional equal access to justice movement as not
what the poor want or need. 133 Merely using the courts does little to
improve the overall status of the poor. It only makes them
dependent on lawyers and leaves them further alienated. 34 Indeed,
recent poverty-law
literature
highlights the subtle yet
counterproductive impact of litigation strategies on a client's long135
term well-being.
131. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT

PROGRAMS, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/welcome.html (last visited Sept.
29, 2004).
132. United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Law Day Speech (May 1,
1964), at http://www.equaljusticeupdate.org/quotations3.htm.
133. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); see also
Susan S. Bowyer, Symposium: New Approaches to Poverty Law, Teaching, and Practice:
ChallengingLegal Culturefrom Classroom to Practice:A Case Study of New College's Politics of
Law PracticeCourse, 4 B.U. PUB.INT. L.J. 363 (1995).

134. Wexler, supra note 133, at 1053; see also Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Critical
Legal Studies Symposium: Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
135. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: LearningLessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2139 (1991); see also GERALD LOPEz, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Wes Daniels,

"Derelicts," RecurringMisfortune, Economic Hard Times and Lifestyle Choices: JudicialImages
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Implicit in scholastic critique is the acknowledgment that
lawyers do have a duty to be more proactive in combating poverty.
If this is true, lawyers should practice with a holistic and
collaborative vision involving the community, encouraging
community participation in decision-making and developing nonhierarchical partnerships with clients. After all, as Kurt Vonnegut
once noted, "[C]ommunities are all that is substantial about what we
create or defend or maintain in this world. All the rest is hoopla."1 36
One example of how a holistic and collaborative law practice 137
can work is the San Francisco Tenants' Union (SFTU). Comprised of
tenants and tenant attorneys engaging in grassroots political and
community organizing, its mission is to teach "self-help and lay
lawyering." 138 The tenants were able to help themselves in the 1998
district elections by getting on the ballot, and passing, a countywide
measure placing a moratorium on certain types of evictions. 139
Another example of this "multi-dimensional" 140 lawyering is the
Asian Law Alliance (Alliance) in San Jose, California. Developed on
the premise that "progressive lawyers are community activists with
legal training,"' 4 ' the role of the lawyer in the Alliance's mission is

more akin to an educator than to a legal advocate. The Alliance
conducts English-as-a-Second-Language workshops for recent
immigrants, offers vocational classes, and seeks to bridge the
of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 687 (1997)
(arguing that lawyers need to look beyond traditional litigation and instead work in
concert with their clients to find alternative solutions); Anita Hodgkiss, Note, Petitioning
and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987) (arguing that lawyers
should advocate political action).
136. Kurt Vonnegut, Address at the Rice University Commencement Ceremonies
(May 9, 1998), at http://www.vonnegutweb.com/vonnegutia/commencement/
rice.html.
137. Not to be confused with "collaborative lawyering" in the mediation context,
where opposing lawyers agree never to represent their respective clients in litigation as
an act of good-faith to settle their matters in a timely and economical manner.
138. LOPEZ, supra note 135, at 70.
139. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PROPOSITION G, No. 237-99 (1999) (prohibiting owner

move-in evictions against the elderly and disabled).
140. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 538 (1987-88). White analyzes
activist lawyering as follows: "one-dimensional" lawyer reflects the LSC ideology,
heavily grounded in the assumption that the courts are the only forum for remedying
injustice. Id. "Two-dimensional" lawyers are those who use the legal system to increase
public awareness of injustice. Id. "Three-dimensional" lawyers do not aim to change
society's view about the poor-they develop political agenda and consciousness among
the poor themselves. Id. Three dimensional lawyers teach people how to think in ways
that will lead to collective action. Id.
141. Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 1 ASIAN L.J. 189, 210 (1994) (reviewing
LOPEZ, supra note 135).
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cultural gap between the Western legal system and South Asian
cultural values.142
Another recognized holistic law practice is the Bar Association
of San Francisco's Volunteer Legal Services Program (VLSP). As the
city's most comprehensive legal services program, it provides social
and psychological services to its clients who initially come in for
legal assistance. 143 To VLSP, providing legal services is just a web to
catch a client's underlying social or psychological problems. VLSP
operates a consumer rights and bankruptcy clinic, a restraining
order clinic, a disability benefits project, a monthly drop-in legal
clinic, and an asylum project. 44 VLSP also provides business and
legal assistance to nonprofits in San Francisco. 145 In addition, it
works closely with transitional housing programs for the mentally
disabled, and staffs HAP, a homeless advocacy comprehensive
needs office. 146
During the late 1990s, it created the Legal
Employment Action Program (LEAP) in response to welfare-towork reform laws. 147 Working in collaboration with various private
law firms, LEAP provided job training and placement to qualified
single mothers. 48 LEAP offered three months of vocational training,
followed by guaranteed placement with private law firms or
corporations. 149 To date, more than fifty women, many of whom
never graduated from high school, have gone on to embark on
careers involving legal support.'5 0 Most of the participants were
former clients seeking legal assistance.' 5 '
All the aforementioned programs-the SFTU, the Alliance, and
VLSP-never once received a penny of LSC funds. Yet their
approaches, each unique in its own way, have made positive longterm changes in the communities they seek to serve. Unfortunately,
current LSC grantees are prevented from implementing their own
innovative programs, as they remain tangled in a regulatory
quagmire. Thus, the LSC restrictions and budget cuts should come
as a blessing in disguise. They force the LSC recipient to conjure up
alternative funding schemes. In so doing, an organization can
change organically from being litigation-minded and adversarialdriven to become proactive, collaborative and holistic in its practice.
142. Id.
143. VOLUNTEER LEGAL SERVS. PROGRAM, INC., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2001).

144. Id. at 3-11.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 10.
148. Id.
149. Interview with Lily McGuiness, LEAP Coordinator, Volunteer Legal Services
Program, in San Francisco, Cal. (Apr. 7, 2002).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Conclusion
Working around the funding restrictions gives the legal aid
attorney a chance to reach out to other allies, such as social workers,
educators, the clergy, and private practitioners. In the introduction,
I mentioned in passing the private bar's adoption of their clients'
mantra of maximizing profits. Aside from giving the legal aid
attorney an incentive to break from the shackles of the LSC, the
crisis in funding restrictions also serves as an opportunity for the
legal profession, as a whole, to become reacquainted with its more
noble mission -the very source of its legitimacy.
The disparity between rich and poor is reinforced whenever the
rich are able to choose a white-shoe firm while the poor are forced to
go to an overcrowded intake line at the legal services office. 152
Moreover, the uninsured middle-class is left in between the
trenches, caught in a Catch-22 between not being able to afford a
competent attorney and not qualifying for legal aid.15 3 These
disparities emphasize subordination by economic class, a concept
that is not supposed to exist in our legal system but is impossible to
ignore.
Detractors may point out that LSC recipients already do too
much, and that such restrictions are necessary to ensure that
government funds are not used to further political ideologies. They
may also point out that two trends related to assisting pro per
litigants provide adequate access for those who fall through the
cracks created by the LSC's income and substantive restrictions.
Those trends involve
limited scope representation, also known as
"unbundling," 154 and self-help centers 155 sponsored by the courts
152. Andrea J. Saltzman, Private Bar Delivery of Civil Legal Services to the Poor:A Design
for a Combined Private Attorney and Staffed Office Delivery System, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1165,
1174 (1983) (noting that representation by private attorneys minimizes the stigmatization
of the poor, for they are not sent to separate but equal law offices or subjected to a
different brand of justice than the rich).
153. Note that under LSC eligibility guidelines, recipients may only serve clients who
are earning below 125 percent of the poverty level. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(b) (2004).
154. "Unbundling" is the practice of allowing the client to allocate the division of
discrete lawyering tasks rather than having the lawyer engage in a full-service
arrangement. For the client, this means lower fees and more control. For the lawyer,
this means serving more as a coach than as a full advocate. See generally FORREST S.
MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES 1-12 (2000).

155. Since 2002, the San Francisco Superior Court has provided pro per litigants with
an ACCESS Center (Assisting Court Customers with Educational Services and Self-Help
Services) and FLASH (Family Law Assistance and Self-Help). See Nancy McCarthy, Plan
To Help UnrepresentedLitigants Sparks Board Debate, CAL. B.J., Jan. 2004, at 1, 18.
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and bar associations. But both of these plans are deficient in one
major respect-the litigants do not have access to a lawyer
providing full service representation. Thus, they remain on unequal
terms. Moreover, these programs ignore the preventive efforts that
a holistic and collaborative law practice has to offer.
When individuals are represented on equal terms, however,
representation becomes more than a token gesture by the legal
profession. It becomes an articulation of a commitment to equal
justice under the law, a principle central to our jurisprudence. Thus,
the LSC's failure to live up to its mission is a golden opportunity for
legal services organizations to seek other viable funding alternatives
as well as to re-evaluate how the legal profession should aid the
poor. I hope this article demonstrates that the two are not mutually
exclusive.
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